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LLOYD MORRIS, JUDY K. MORRIS, : 
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: Priority No. 15 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from an order of the Third Judicial 
District Court, dated December 3, 1999 (R. 112-13), which granted 
summary judgment against Great West for failure to file a notice 
of claim under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Great West 
filed a timely notice of appeal on December 30, 1999 (R. 119-20) 
and an amended notice on January 6, 2000 (R. 123-24), which 
corrected the case caption. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(1996) gives this Court jurisdiction over the appeal by order of 
transfer from the Supreme Court of Utah dated February 23, 2000. 
ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue before the Court is whether the insurer of a 
damaged, company-owned semi-tractor can evade the notice-of-claim 
requirement of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act by relying 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
solely on the notice filed by the semifs driver in his own behalf 
for personal injuries he sustained in an accident while driving 
the insured semi. The driver's notice, while alluding to the 
damage to the semi, made no reference to either the semi's owner 
or its insurer. 
Standard of Review; "When reviewing summary judgment 
determinations, [the court] review[s] for correction of error, 
considering the facts and inferences in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party." Tallman v. City of Hurricane, 1999 UT 
55, Hi, 985 P.2d 892; see also Petersen v. South Salt Lake City, 
1999 UT 93, 1|2, 987 P.2d 57. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, 
and rules pertinent to the issue before the Court is contained in 
the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
Below 
Plaintiffs Lloyd and Judy Morris filed the original 
complaint in this case on February 10, 1999 (R. 1-8). The 
complaint alleged that an accident in which the semi-tractor 
driven by Lloyd Morris struck a cow on a state-controlled highway 
was caused by the negligence of the Utah Department of 
Transportation (UDOT) and resulted in serious injury to both 
2 
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plaintiffs. Five weeks later, an amended complaint was filed 
(R. 23-31), adding appellant Great West Casualty Company as a 
plaintiff and a new subrogation claim of $42,492.50 on its behalf 
for damage to the semi, which was owned by M&P Transportation 
(R. 28, H1 22-25). After filing its answer (R. 34-43), UDOT 
moved for summary judgment against Great West (R. 71-72), 
asserting in its supporting memorandum (R. 73-79) that Great 
West's cause of action should be dismissed for failure to file a 
notice of claim. In response (R. 87-93), Great West argued that 
because Lloyd Morris' notice of claim stated that "damage to 
claimant's semi exceeds $48,000.00" (R. 79)--even though 
"claimant" was clearly identified in the notice as "Lloyd Morris" 
(R. 78), and the notice made no mention of Great West--Morris' 
notice was effective to fulfill any notice obligation on Great 
West's part. By minute entry of November 18, 1999, the district 
court granted UDOT's motion "based upon the analysis and 
authorities set forth in Defendant's memoranda in support and in 
reply" (R. 110). An order to the same effect was entered on 
December 3, 1999 (R. 112-14), and a stipulated dismissal of the 
Morrises' claims was filed on December 21, 1999 (R. 117-18). 
This appeal followed (R. 119-20; R. 123-24). 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
In their memorandum opposing summary judgment, plaintiffs 
agreed that the facts on which UDOT's motion was based are 
undisputed (see R. 88). They are as follows (R. 73-74 and the 
documents referenced therein): 
3 
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On October 20, 1997, Lloyd Morris was driving a semi-tractor 
on Interstate 80 in Tooele County. Judy Morris was also riding 
in the vehicle. The semi struck a cow in the road and rolled, 
injuring the Morrises and damaging the vehicle, which was owned 
by M&P Transportation and insured by Great West. Great West 
compensated M&P for the damage. Neither Great West nor M&P filed 
a notice of claim pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
On May 13, 1998, Lloyd Morris, as claimant, filed a notice of 
claim through his attorney, Mitchell R. Jensen, which states: 
"The damage to claimant' s semi exceeds $48,000.00. Claimant 
alleges his injuries and property damage are the direct and 
proximate result of an improperly maintained fence which allowed 
the animal to stray onto the highway" (R. 74, % 6). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah case law has consistently held that the notice-of-claim 
provision of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act requires strict 
compliance. Under the act, any person who has a claim against a 
governmental entity must file a written notice of claim, signed 
by the claimant or the claimant's attorney. Under the rules of 
statutory construction, "person" includes corporations and 
companies. Therefore, Great West Casualty Company, as a "person" 
with a claim, was obligated to file its own notice. Moreover, 
Great West's argument that UDOT received actual notice of its 
claim is of no significance. Case precedent has conclusively 
4 
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established that actual notice does not relieve a plaintiff of 
the duty to file a notice of claim. 
Great West attempts to circumvent this requirement by 
arguing, for the first time on appeal, that Lloyd Morris was, at 
all times, its agent (see Aplt. Brief at 4) and the agent of M&P 
(see id. at 8). However, it fails to identify any legal elements 
of agency authority or to cite evidence of record demonstrating 
an agency relationship with Mr. Morris. In addition, because it 
made no mention of an agency theory in the district court, its 
argument is waived for purposes of appeal. 
Great West misapprehends Moreno v. Board of Education. 
Unlike the foster parents in Moreno, Lloyd Morris has no 
demonstrated authority, by statute or otherwise, to maintain an 
action or file a claim for Great West's benefit. Moreover, the 
subrogation theory under which Great West brought its claim 
permits it to stand only in the shoes of the entity whose loss it 
was legally obligated to pay. The loss paid here was the loss 
sustained by M&P, the owner of the semi, not the loss sustained 
by Lloyd Morris. 
For these reasons, as more fully explained below, the 
summary judgment in UDOT's favor must stand. 
5 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DRIVER'S NOTICE OF CLAIM FOR HIS PERSONAL 
INJURIES WAS INADEQUATE TO FULFILL THE STATUTORY 
REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE FOR THE INSURER OF THE COMPANY-
OWNED SEMI-TRACTOR. 
The requirements for a notice of claim are clearly spelled 
out in statute. Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11, 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a 
governmental entity, or against its employee for an act 
or omission occurring during the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority shall file a written notice of 
claim with the entity before maintaining an action, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise 
to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; 
and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the 
claimant, so far as they are known. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (Supp. 1999). In addition, the notice 
must be "signed by the person making the claim or that person's 
agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian11 (Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-11(3)(b)(i) (Supp. 1999)). 
The notice of claim filed by Lloyd Morris fails to provide 
adequate notice of Great West's claim in several particulars. 
First, by listing only Mr. Morris as claimant (R.. 78), the notice 
fails to disclose Great West as a "person having a claim" under 
the statute.1 Second, no facts in the notice reveal the nature 
!It is beyond dispute that Great West is a "person" for 
purposes of the statute. Under the rules of statutory 
construction, "[p]erson includes individuals, bodies politic and 
corporate, partnerships, associations, and companies." Utah Code 
Ann. § 68-3-12(2) (o) (Supp. 1999). 
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of Great Westfs claim, its subrogation interest as insurer of the 
company-owned semi-tractor. Finally, the notice is not signed by 
anyone purporting to act on Great West's behalf. In fact, Great 
West concedes in its brief that it did not retain the Morrises' 
attorneys to represent it until September 23, 1998, more than 
four months after Lloyd Morris filed his notice of claim (see 
Aplt. Brief at 7). Under these facts, Lloyd Morris' notice 
cannot serve as notice on Great West's behalf. 
Great West bases its argument on the ground that Lloyd 
Morris' notice gave UDOT actual notice of the property damage 
claim, allowing UDOT to conduct a timely investigation (see Aplt. 
Brief at 7-8). However, actual notice cannot cure Great West's 
default. As Utah's supreme court has repeatedly held, "'[a]ctual 
knowledge of the circumstances . . . does not dispense with the 
necessity of filing a timely claim.'" Sears v. Southworth, 563 
P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1977) (quoting Varoz v. Sevev, 29 Utah 2d 
158, 506 P.2d 435, 436 (1973); see also Scarborough v. Granite 
Sch. Dist., 531 P.2d 480, 481-82 (Utah 1975). Further, in these 
cases, the actual, though ineffective, notice of the incidents 
giving rise to the cause of action was given directly to the 
defendant by the affected party. By contrast, Great West did not 
attempt to give any notice of its claim to UDOT prior to joining 
with the Morris plaintiffs in their lawsuit. If even direct, 
actual notice by the claiming party to a potential defendant 
cannot substitute for a formal notice of claim, the incidental 
mention of property damage to a vehicle not owned by the claimant 
7 
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driver here cannot be deemed adequate to apprise UDOT of Great 
West's subrogation claim. 
II. THE NATURE OF A SUBROGATION CLAIM DOES NOT PLACE 
GREAT WEST IN THE SHOES OF THE SEMI-TRACTORf S DRIVER. 
"Subrogation is an equitable doctrine that allows a person 
or entity which pays the loss or satisfies the claim of another 
under a legally cognizable obligation or interest to step into 
the shoes of the other person and assert that person's rights." 
Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 
890 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Utah 1995). In the case at bar, the 
undisputed facts show that Great West's subrogation claim permits 
it to stand in the shoes of the insured semi-tractor's owner, 
whose loss it paid, but not its driver. As Great West explains 
in its brief, 
In the present case, on or about October 20, 1997, 
Lloyd Morris was driving a semi-tractor owned by M&P 
Transportation ("M&P") and insured by Great West. 
While driving the semi-tractor eastbound on 1-80 Lloyd 
Morris struck a cow resulting in personal injury to 
both he [sic] and his wife Judy Morris and property 
damage to the semi-tractor. Following the incident, 
Great West paid M&P' s claim for property damage to the 
semi-tractor. Great West then asserted its subrogation 
claim against UDOT for reimbursement of the 
approximately $48,000 paid on the property damage 
claim. 
Aplt. Brief at 7 (emphasis added). Under the facts admitted by 
Great West, the subrogation doctrine permits it to stand in the 
shoes of M&P, whose claim it satisfied under its legally 
cognizable obligation as M&P's insurer. However, there is no 
evidence of record that M&P made any claim or filed any notice 
against UDOT; in fact, Great West admitted below that neither did 
8 
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(see Statement of Relevant Facts at 3-4, supra). Consequently, 
Great West having filed no notice of its own, its subrogation 
claim fails. 
The injuries sustained by the Morrises, which were the 
subject of timely notices of claim, do not change this analysis. 
Great West does not assert that it paid or was under any legal 
duty to compensate the Morrises for their injuries. Therefore, 
it has no legally cognizable interest in the suit between the 
Morrises and UDOT. 
In short, neither Great West nor its insured, M&P, gave 
appropriate written notice of their property damage claim to 
UDOT. The Morrises, who filed individual notices of claim, have 
no valid claim for damage to M&P's insured property, and their 
notices neither mentioned Great West or M&P nor listed them as 
claimants. Great West is consequently in default of the 
statutory notice provision that is a mandatory prerequisite to 
suit. On these grounds, the district court granted summary 
judgment in UDOT's favor, and Great West has failed to 
demonstrate error in the court's decision. 
III. THE MORENO CASE INVOLVES A STATUTORY RIGHT TO SUE 
ON ANOTHER'S BEHALF THAT IS NOT PRESENT IN THIS CASE. 
Great West places its reliance exclusively on Moreno v. 
Board of Education, 926 P.2d 886 (Utah 1996), to demonstrate that 
a notice of claim filed by one party can suffice to raise the 
interest of an unnamed individual who is the actual party in 
interest. In Moreno, the legal guardians of a minor child sued 
for the child's wrongful death, not naming the natural mother as 
9 
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a plaintiff, and the supreme court held the guardians1 notice of 
claim sufficient to provide notice of the natural mother's 
claims. While a superficial reading of Moreno may suggest a 
factual similarity to the case at bar, the underlying legal 
analysis reveals its inapplicability to Great West's claim. 
The Moreno case involved two separate opinions. The first 
involved extensive legal analysis of the statutes governing the 
guardians' right to sue and concluded 
that while the rights and responsibilities of a 
guardian flowing out of legal custody of the ward 
terminate upon the death of the ward, the guardian's 
ability to maintain an action for the wrongful death of 
a minor flows from the guardian's residual duty of 
accounting and does not terminate upon the minor's 
death. This obligation is not for the personal benefit 
of the guardian, but is among a guardian's residual 
duties upon the death of his ward, and therefore any 
wrongful death action must be brought in behalf of the 
ward's heirs. 
Moreno, 926 P.2d at 890. All five justices agreed with this 
analysis. Two justices further concluded on the basis of this 
analysis that the guardians' notice of claim, specifically filed 
on their own behalf, was legally insufficient to raise the 
interests of the unnamed natural mother. The remaining three 
justices concluded to the contrary. However, the linchpin of 
their conclusion was the guardians' statutory authorization to 
maintain suit on the heirs' behalf: "Since section 78-11-6 
authorizes a guardian to maintain an action for the wrongful 
death of his ward, it follows that the guardian has the authority 
to file the prerequisite notice of claim." Id. at 892. 
10 
< 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the present case, Great West has pointed to no statute 
which gives the driver of a semi-tractor authority to file a 
notice of claim on behalf of the insurer of a vehicle in which 
the driver has no insurable interest. Great Westf s belated 
assertion to the contrary, Lloyd Morris' notice of claim gives no 
indication that he is filing on Great West's behalf as its agent, 
attorney, parent, or legal guardian. There is no indication that 
Lloyd Morris had the authority to negotiate or compromise Great 
West's claim. In fact, there is no mention of Great West at all. 
To the contrary, Great West openly declares at the end of its 
brief that "the claim was filed by Morris on his own behalf 
rather than in a representative capacity for M&P or Great West" 
(Aplt. Brief at 10). 
Plaintiff's agency claim fails not only factually, but 
procedurally. "This court will not consider issues raised for 
the first time on appeal absent plain error or exceptional 
circumstances." York v. Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590, 594 (Utah App. 
1994); accord Connor v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 972 P.2d 414, 418 
(Utah 1998); Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 
233-34 (Utah 1998) . Great West has not cited the record to show 
that the agency issue was raised below, and on appeal, it has not 
argued either plain error or exceptional circumstances that would 
justify consideration of the issue by this Court. Further, "[i]t 
is well established that an appellate court will decline to 
consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately 
brief." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998); 
11 
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see also State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, 1 11, 974 P.2d 269. As in 
that case, Great West here not only fails to cite the record, but 
refers to no legal authority in support of its agency claim. Its 
cursory mention of agency is insufficient to fulfill Great West's 
duty under Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a)(9): "The argument shall contain 
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the 
issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue 
not preserved in the trial court, with citations to authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on." 
Moreno is further distinguishable from Great West's case. 
In Moreno, the basis of the natural mother's cause of action, 
wrongful death, was the same ground that the guardians raised on 
their own behalf. Here, the basis of Great West's cause of 
action, damage to the semi-tractor, diverges completely from the 
basis of the Morrises' personal injury claims and requires 
completely different evidence to sustain. There is simply no 
factual identity between Great West's and the Morrises' claims. 
Finally, in Moreno, the supreme court noted that the 
statutory scheme provided for the maintenance of only a single 
action, for the benefit of the heirs, that could be brought by 
either the guardian or the heirs themselves (see 926 P.2d at 
889), making the guardian legally capable of filing the requisite 
notice (see id. at 892). In the present case, because the . 
grounds for their claims are distinct, both the Morrises and 
Great West could have maintained separate actions. The lack of 
identity between Great West's and the Morrises' claims 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
distinguishes it both factually and legally from the single claim 
raised in Moreno. For this reason, Moreno cannot serve as 
precedent to save Great West from its duty of notice. 
CONCLUSION 
At bottom, Great West's argument is simply that because UDOT 
had actual notice, through Lloyd Morris' notice of claim, of the 
damage to the semi-tractor, UDOT can show no prejudice to its 
interests that justifies dismissal of Great West's claim. As 
discussed above, the defendant's actual knowledge of a claim does 
not relieve a plaintiff of its notice obligation. No showing of 
prejudice on UDOT's part is necessary to overcome Great West's 
procedural default. Because Great West did not file a notice of 
claim, its action cannot go forward, as the district court 
correctly concluded. Because Great West has not shown error in 
this conclusion, UDOT respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
the district court's Order Granting Summary Judgment Against 
Plaintiff Great West Casualty Company. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Because there is little case law addressing the meaning of 
Moreno v. Board of Education, defendant believes oral argument 
would assist in clarifying its scope. Consequently, defendant 
respectfully requests both oral argument and a published opinion 
in this case. 
13 
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DATED this (,^-Hy, day of April, 2000. 
NANCY I>. KEMP 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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